In order to clarify further the fiscal structure and historical characteristics of central administrative offices in ancient Japan governed under the Ritsuryo律令 legal codes introduced from Tang China, the author of the present article focuses on discourse conducted to date on the aspects of budgeting and fiscal management, in particular comparing the duties of the Tax Revenue Accounting Office (Shukeiryo 主計寮) of the Civil Affairs Bureau (Minbusho民部省) with the fiscal management agencies of the Tang Dynasty’s central government.
The funds necessary to operate the Ritsuryo state’s administrative apparatus were allotted on a project-by-project basis through a process of application and approval deliberated by the Shukeiryo. In contrast to the Tang emperors formally receiving annual budget reports from their fiscal management office, the Takushi 度支, the emperors of Japan did not participate in state fiscal operations. Moreover, in Japan the project funding applications submitted by administrative agencies gradually became predetermined, thus formalizing the Shukeiryo’s budgeting function.
In terms of the procurement of administrative funding, the Tang Dynasty Takushi not only relied on the general taxation system, but also a system of trade that utilized local fiscal resources. At the initial stages of the Japanese Ritsuryo system, provisions allowed only for institutions procuring the wherewithal for rites and ceremonies from exclusively within the capital (Kinai畿内) region, in stark contrast to the revenue procurement function of Tang Dynasty fiscal managers, revealing institutions continued from pre-Ritsuryo times. With the increased need for funding as the central bureaucracy expanded, the demand was met by the expansion of a system of trade in-kind procuring revenue sources from outside the capital region to fund the central government.
With respect to budgeting, it was the Tang Dynasty Office of Auditing (Hibu 比部) that kept accounts of the whole country’s annual fiscal situation. Also in Tang China each administrative office possessed its own independent source of funds called gongxie 公廨, the use of which the Hibu auditors also prepared an accounting settlement. The duties of the Hibu were assumed in Japan by the Shukeiryo, which dealt less with annual budgeting than confirming the conditions of each administrative office's store supplies, revealing that at the early stages of the Ritsuryo system in Japan each administrative office did not possess its own independent sources of revenue, thus reducing the significance of accounting settlement procedures.
The author concludes that in all fiscal functions---budgeting, procurement and settlement of accounts---the Japanese Ritsuryo institutions differed markedly from those of the Tang Dynasty, indicating the dominance of the pre-Ritsuryo custom of ruling elites at the center redistributing tribute submitted from the provincial regions.

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This article deals with the historical meaning of negotiations on increasing annual payments between the Liao and Song Dynasties in 1042. When we talk about the political circumstances of Liao under Xingzong’s rule, it is important to consider the politica l attitudes of the clans of Qin’ai empress dowager’s and Yelu Zhongyuan, Xingzong’s younger brother. Xiao Xiaomu, a member of Qin’ai empress dowager's clan, and Southern Establishment Military Affairs Commissioner, needed to consider to both his own clan and Xingzong. Because Qin’ai empress dowager had stood by Yelu Zhongyuan as the heir of the emperor, Xingzong had to give political consideration and powers to Yelu Zhongyuan.
In the twelfth lunar month of 1042 (the twelfth year of Chongxi), after deliberations with Xiao Xiaomu and Northern Establishment Military Affairs Commissioner Xiao Hui, Xingzong emperor decided to go to war with the Song Dynasty with casus belli recovering Guannan territory. We can verify Xiao Xiaomu did not approve of going to war with Song, but did not have support of the members of Qin’ai empress dowager's clan. Xingzong began to prepare for war, and at the same time, dispatched Xiao Ying and Liu Liufu as envoys to Song. A diplo-matic letter to Song, written by Liu Liufu, was stolen by Liang Jishi’s intelligence and was reported to the Song central government before negotiations could begin. After receiving the intelligence reports, Song decided to increase annual payments to Liao to mollify Xingzong, and dispatched Fu Bi as an envoy to Liao.
During negotiations, each person had a different standpoint. From the beginning of negotiation, Xingzong demanded the recovery of Guannan territory from the Song. By contrast, Fu Bi tried to persuad Xingzong of the benefits of increased payments by Song to Liao. He finally succeeded in concluding a new agreement, which stated that the increase in annual payments was in lieu of the cession of Guannan territory. Liu Liufu, however, had a different position from Xingzong’s because he was not concerned with ceding territory to Song. On the on hand was his loyalty to Xingzong emperor, on the other hand was his personal need to take care of Yanjing District, which was the base of his family.
Because of the prevention of war between Liao and Song, the nomadic tribes of Liao became dissatisfied because they had no chance to raid Song, which meant that they could not raid its wealth. In the nomadic states, war was associated with the raiding and the redistribution of wealth. This relationship between Liao emperors and nomadic tribes can be compared to the relationship between nomadic leaders and tribes in earlier periods. Furthermore, Liao's intimidation can be recognized as its diplomatic strategy. From Liu Liufu’s standpoint, his negotiations converted Liao’s war preparations into ‘intimidation’ to induced to Song to pay Liao more payments.

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