Der Autor versucht, die vor und wahrend der Revolution 1848 in Berlin stattgefundenen zwei Subsistenzproteste zu untersuchen und damit einen Aspekt der Veranderungen des Verhaltnisses zwischen dem Staat und den Unterschichten in diesem Zeitraum zu analysieren. Vom Mittelalter bis zum ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert hatte die obrigkeit den Markt reguliert -z.B. den Zwischenhandel strikt eingeschrankt und bestimmte Brotpreise festgesetzt-, um die Konsumen ten vor Teuerungen zu bewahren. Durch die >preuBischen Reformen< am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts, die die >Gewerbefreiheit< einfuhrten, wurden diese Marktregulierungen abgeschafft, und das Marktgeschehen wurde damit dem Gesetz der Marktwirtschaft uberlassen. Dies hieB, daB das gegenseitige und reziproke VerhaltniB zwischen dem Staat und den Unterschichten im Sinne von Schutz und Gehorsamkeit abgebaut wurde. In dieser Situation, als im April 1847 die Lebensmittelpreise stiegen, fand eine Revolte, die >Kartoffel-Revolution<. Die Volksmassen griffen Backer und Hoker an, die am Wochenmarkt Kartoffel verkauften. Die Handlungsweise der Volksmassen zeigt deren eigene Vorstellungen und Logik. Danach habe die Obrigkeit dafur Sorge zu tragen, daB Nahrungsmittel zum angemessenen Preis angeboten werden, und wenn die Obrigkeit versage, mussen das Volk zur Selbsthilfe greifen. Sie forderten die Wiederherstellung der traditionellen Norm. Der preuBische Staat konnte keine konsistenten MaBnahmen ergreifen, und auch die Polizei und das Militar konnten die Revolte nicht effektiv durch physische Gewalt niederschlagen. Die Stadtbehorden, die das Berliner Burgertum vertraten, kritisierten diese staatlichen MaBnahmen und versuchten, alternative MaBnahmen und eine neue Sicherheitsorganisation zu schaffen. Auf diese Weise verlor der Staat einen Teil seiner Regierungsfahigkeit, und im nachsten Jahr, 1848, begann die Revolution. Im April 1848 fand wieder ein Brotkrawall statt. Die Volksmassen forderten die offentliche Festsetzung eines bestimmten Brotpreises (Brodtaxe) und zwangen die Backer, Brot zum angemessenen Preis zu verkaufen. Die Mehrheit der Demokraten, die ein Bundnis mit den Unterschichten suchten, lehnten aber ihre Forderung ab, denn sie hielten sich an der >Gewerbefreiheit<, wie die anderen Burger. Die Stadt- und Polizeibehorden arbeiteten eng zusammen, um eine vollkommene Liberalisierung der Brotpreisregelung einzufuhren. Sie unterdruckten daher die Unterschichtenproteste. Andererseits versuchte die neue, von den >Elite<-Handwerksgesellen organisierte >Arbeiterverbruderung<, durch >Assoziation<, d.h. Genossenschaft, die Subsistenzprobleme zu losen, und vermied eine direkte Aktion. Sie begann, die Form der Volksbewegung zu verandern. Die neue Polizei unter der Leitung von Hinckeldey nach der Revolution unterschied sich wesentlich von der Polizei im Vormarz. Sie zeigte den Einwohnern, daB sich die Obrigkeit wegen der Teuerung sorgte, und versuchte damit, der Bevolkerung die Obrigkeit als einen Schutz erscheinen zu lassen. Andererseits baute sie eine effektive Sicherheitsorganisation, die >Schutzmannschaft<, auf. Die Moglichkeit der Subsistenzproteste ging verloren. Die Revolution von 1848 war also ein Wendepunkt, wo eine neue Art von Herrschaft geschaffen wurde.

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From the mid-1880s into the 1890s the machine reeling industry in Suwa (Nagano Prefecture) overwhelmed the hand reeling method used in Kozuke (Gumma Prefecture) and began the formation of silk thread mass production there. This period may therefore be called the era of silk industrial capital formation. It goes without saying that finance played an important part in this achievement, but we have yet to see any analysis of the dynamic relationship between the rise of silk capital and how it was financed. In the present paper the author attempts to rescue the research from the realm of static analysis carried out around the concept of "policy-generated finance" and study the dynamics of silk financing during this period centering around the economic depression of 1890, outline how it evolved from there, and view the interrelationship between finance and capital accumulation in Japan's silk industry. Silk finance, which was rapidly accelerating the industry's growth and capital accumulation despite overall low capital accumulation, required comprehensive integration of the production and distribution systems, from "original principal" (money for cocoon purchase) funding to advances on bills of exchange from silk reelers. However, the granting of credit which formed the basis for the provision of "original principal" based on accommodation bill discounting could not at the onset be handled by the existing silk financial institutions alone, and was thus carried out through tie-ups with Yokohama Specie Bank, urban and rural banks and outlet whole-salers, all centered around the Bank of Japan re-discounting. Under expanded credit from the Bank of Japan a system for linking together silk financial institutions was formed. However, given that credit expanded through policy decisions is directly determined by the business cycle, economically depressed conditions give rise to recurring, potentially destructive credit contraction. Therefore, silk finance had to display a business cycle inclusive capacity to adjust, given credit control via the Bank of Japan re-discounting practices ; and to display such a capacity, it was necessary for the system integrating silk financial institutions under Bank of Japan credit to function properly. A production/distribution integrating, business cycle-inclusive, comprehensive system for silk finance developed in three stages. The first stage, occurring between 1887 and 1893 (and including the panic of 1890) was marked by the formation of the system around the Bank of Japan and Yokohama Specie Bank, as well as structural changes in Yokohama financial markets. The second stage, occurring between 1894 and 1900, was marked by an expansion of the system under the leadership of the Bank of Japan and Yokohama Specie Bank, with large amounts of "original principal" provided by the Bank of Japan. The third and final stage, occurring after the panic of 1900, was marked by a move away from the Bank of Japan "original principal" funding and growing independence of the system, despite the need for "relief" loans under the Bank of Japan re-discounting during the panic. In other words, the system increased its independence from 1901 on the basis of the Bank of Japan credit. In this way silk industry finance continued to expand emphasizing "original principal" while the credit created by growing silk financial institutions was employed in greater and greater amounts for capital accumulation in the silk industry. At the same time, credit expansion and contraction effects increased under the Bank of Japan credit. As far as silk industry capital as a whole is concerned, the gradual establishment and development of a production/distribution integrating, business cycle inclusive, comprehensive silk finance system brought about the gradual realization of an environment that accelerated capital accumulation in the industry.

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In 1230 and 1242, Henry III, king of England, issued writs of arms which contained tariffs of military obligation based on the Assize of Arms of 1181. In these writs, there were important revisions of the provisions for knight fee holders, and these changes must be interpreted in their relation to the distraint of knighthood during the same reign. The writ of 1230 increased the categories of knight fee holders from one to two ; that is, a whole-fee holder and a half-fee holder, each of whom was equated with a holder of 15 mark chattel or 10 mark chattel. The provision of a half-fee holder, which was not incorporated in the Assize in 1181, was added because the writs of distraint of knighthood from 1224 to 1230 ordered the holder of one or more knight's fees to be made a knight, and it was necessary to distinguish between the whole-fee holders and other partial holders. The equation of knight fee holders with wealthy free holders, in turn, inspired the writs of distraint from 1240 to 1242, which prescribed that the holder of a whole knight's fee, or twenty librates in socage or military tenure, was to be distrained to become a knight. As a result of these writs introducing the twenty-librate rule, the clause of knight fee holders in the writ of arms in 1242 was deleted. The highest group of jurati ad arma ; i.e., the holders of twenty librates, became knights. After 1242 the writs of arms and the distraint of knighthood thus, were integrated into a total system of military obligation in the reign of Henry III.

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