This article examines the system of land allotment in ancient Japan from the aspects of related procedures, household registers and land surveys leading to allotments. The author begins with a comparison between the Japanese and Tang Dynasty land codes containing allotment procedures and discovers that the system in Japan was controlled at the top by the Ministry of State (Dajokan 太政官) and managed locally by provincial-level governments (kokushi 国司), concluding that the most important feature of the code was a focus on leadership at the center. The way in which the Dajokan controlled land allotment was refined in a number of steps during first half of the eighth century and was probably completed at mid-century as the land allotment procedures seen in the Engi Era revisions pertaining to the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Minbusho 民部省). According to these revisions, two accounting ledgers were proposed: one containing the results of land surveys, the other recording allotees, in order for the Minbusho to keep track of the total number of allotments and per capita land holdings, resulting in a system by which allotment plans for each province were deliberated and accepted by the central government. Local customs concerning the amounts of allotments in each province were subject to final approvement by the central government. An examination of the actual surveying and allotting indicates important involvement on the part of sub-provincial district offices (gunji 郡司) in such areas as administration and actual allotment proposals, duties and procedures that do not appear in the land codes themselves; while the activities of land surveyors and allotters reflect the strong influence of provincial-level governments, as reflected in the land codes. This latter characteristic indicates a strong central government presence as in the dispatch of personnel to implement the allotment system. Together with household registers, land allotment created the household (ko 戸) as the basic unit of control consisting of household members and land. The direct involvement by the central government in the land allotment system, which created ko as the unit of land management, resulted in the break-up of the former system under local chieftains. The overall structure consisting of household registers, surveying and land allotment was very different from the Tang Dynasty system under which the household was established as the unit of land management by household registers. It was this structure that caused the separaion of control over land from control over household members and promoted the development of statistics and maps for land.

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In this study, I analyze how kenmon (powerful Manchu families during the Qing Dynasty) that had no power base in outlying areas were able to exert an influence not only in the court but also in outlying areas taking as a case example the salt trade in which the powerful vassal Mingju of Emperor Kangxi (1661-1722) was involved through the An clan of Changlu salt merchants. In addition, I also examine the process by which this salt trade was controlled by imperial authority centered in the power struggle in the court and control of the Eight Banners during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng (1723-35) and extending as late as the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795). Salt taxation was a major source of income in national fiscal affairs of the Qing Dynasty and the moves of salt merchants engaged in the production and sales of salt had a very significant influence. There was collusion between Mingju of the influential Yehe Nara clan and the Changlu salt merchant An clan in the background of the private salt sales incident of the Changlu salt merchant Zhang Lin exposed in the 44^<th> year of Kangxi (1705). The salt merchant An clan was active behind the scenes as a "family member" under Mingju and, moreover, linked as well to the problem of imperial succession at the time since Yin Tang, the ninth prince of Emperor Kangxi and a relative by marriage of Mingju and the An clan, was in waiting, the problem of the An clan persisted after the death of Mingju until the reign of Emperor Yongzheng. Furthermore, the salt trade in which Mingju and the others were involved did not only include Changlu salt near the capital city but extended beyond to salt from Hedong and Lianghuai, which rendered the situation that much more serious. After ascending the throne, Emperor Yongzheng sought to control the management of the salt trade, which was under the influence of Mingju and An clan, by entrusting it to directly affiliated internal merchants, to booi niyalma, to his own former vassals from the time prior to ascension or to banner prince confidants. For the most part, however, the salt-related initiatives ended in failure and, by the time of the reign of Emperor Qianlong, there was no recourse but to entrust salt affairs to well established salt merchants. Yanwo of more than twenty sections of Henan Province, thought to be under the direct control of Zhang Lin, were unified and, at first, the bureaucrats of internal affairs were dispatched for their management. Ultimately, wealthy Changlu salt merchants were selected and there was no recourse but to entrust management to them in a fixed-term system. In addition, trial and error in salt affairs granted by the Wangfu also continued and greater emphasis came to be placed on the difficulties the government faced in managing the salt operations and the need for the salt trade.

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Despite the dearth of research focusing on the guarantee and provision of financial support from the Tokugawa Bakufu to the imperial court, there is a more concrete aspect from which to view the relationship between the two institutions. Any examination of this aspect would necessitate clarifying the situation and activities of the fiscal agencies under each. In the related research to date, little attention has been paid to court finances, especially such institutions as the sadamedaka 定高制 (fixed income) system, which formed the court's basic fiscal framework during the Kansei 寛政 Era (1789-1801). The preceding article focused on the Kansei and Bunka 文化 Eras (1789-1817) and pointed out that 1) new institutions like the sadamedaka system, which gave new guarantees to the court of a fixed fiscal base within which to operate, functioned smoothly during the initial phase, but 2) towards the end of the Kansei Era, outlays began to increase once more. This article turns to the Bunsei and Tenpo Eras (1818-1844), during which sudden rises in outlays prevented the new fiscal framework from functioning effectively, due to the frequent interim requests for funds made by the imperial household, forcing the Bakufu to channel funds from loans and silver earmarked for the maintenance of its Kyoto Magistrate (Kyoto Machi-Bugyo 京都町奉行 and Deputy (Kyoto Daikan 京都代官). Therefore, It can be said that the Bakufu was giving the imperial household fiscal constant guarantees.

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