In France under the Old Regime, as the absolute monarchy intensified its intervention in urban administration, in order to unify the kingdom, Louis XIV ordered the foundation of “hôpital général” in the cities for the purpose of maintaining social order by means of the imprisonment of beggars. While the interest of historians has focused to date on the trend toward centralization and secularization of the poor relief system, the author of this article has chosen to draw attention to the behavior of elites who practiced charity under the influence of the Catholic Reformation in the provincial capital of Bordeaux, in an attempt to highlight the reality of local government under the absolute monarchy through the prism of poor relief.
An analysis of elites involved in Bordeaux hospitals reveals that local initiative played an important role and that these hospitals, by claiming a religious calling inspired by the Catholic Reformation, remained in tact to meet the needs of the local community, despite the royal will. In fact, the policy to imprison beggars ended in failure shortly after being implemented in the main provincial towns in accordance with the royal prescription issued during the second half of the seventeenth century; while the elites took the initiative in rescuing abandoned children and disabled poor, rather than trying to suppress mendicancy.
Such local autonomy in poor relief was maintained through the action of each elite who practiced charity, in the hope of saving his own soul and/or maintaining order in the local community. These elites gave, as benefactore, a part of his fortune to benefit the foundation or to financially support the hospitals, intensified, as administrator, the efforts of the Catholic Church in the relief and the edification of the poor.
In the city of Bordeaux with its autonomous system of hospitals, although the development of international trade accelerated the rapprochement between the nobility and the bourgeoisie to form new elites, only a handful of them were able to directly devote their talents, their fortunes and their time to the administration of the hospitals and assume the task of administering the poor. Moreover, their achievements opened new pathways to rise above the rest of society, thus further strengthening the oligarchy maintained by a minority of elites.
It was in this way that existing social relationships were maintained on the local level, by the efforts of elites who fulfilled the charitable obligations attached to their power and wealth and ensured law and order in urban society.

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The research to date on the Disaster of Yongjia 永嘉（311 CE）which occurred during the last years of the Western Jin has been conducted from the perspective of the history of the sixteen non-Han kingdoms and the prehistory of the Northern Wei, and while there have been many studies that have focused on the independent statements and actions of the five non-Han Chinese peoples of those kingdoms, what has been lacking is a perspective that seeks to understand their actions in relative terms by taking into account their rivalry with the Jin forces with whom they were then at war. The aim of this article is to reconstruct the course of the conflict between the five non-Han Chinese peoples and the Jin forces on the basis of a precise chronology and textual criticism of source materials with a view to elucidating what really happened during the Disaster of Yongjia.
Liu Yuan 劉淵, Shi Le 石勒 and the other non-Han Chinese generals who fought against the Western Jin were at the start of the uprising overwhelmed by the Jin forces, and in particular, Liu Kun 劉琨 of the Western Jin, the regional inspector（cishi 刺史）of Bingzhou 并州, put continuous pressure on Liu Yuan in the south, compelling him to relocate his capital southwards, and when it became inevitable that if he were to continue moving south, he would eventually reach the Western Jin capital of Luoyang 洛陽, Liu Yuan proclaimed himself king of the Han and made clear his intention to overthrow the Western Jin by attacking Luoyang. However, Liu's forces was repulsed by those of Prince Yue 越 of Donghai 東海, who happened to be returning to Luoyang at that particular time. Then Liu Yuan's death presented Liu Kun and Prince Yue with the unexpected opportunity of launching a pincer operation against the Han. Thereafter the defeat of this pincer operation became the main challenge facing that kingdom.
From around this time, unrest had also been building up on the Jin side, with Jin forces defecting from Prince Yue. There was also a continuous exodus of military forces from Luoyang, including Prince Yue's departure and death. This resulted in a weakening of the pincer movement, and in 311（Yongjia ５）Luoyang fell to the Han. Liu Kun in the north was also defeated in a Han attack, and this led to the collapse of the pincer operation.
In view of the above train of events, it is evident that the Disaster of Yongjia did not necessarily come about as a result of the independent strategy of Liu Yuan and other non-Han generals or their consistent ascendency over the Western Jin. Rather, it was an outcome that was influenced by the military and political environment both within and without their own sphere of influence.

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[in Japanese]

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