The aim of this article is to elucidate the connection between the theoretical and practical themes in the “Self-Consciousness” chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit by focusing on the discussion surrounding the opposition between “knowledge” and “object”. Accordingly, this article refers to John McDowell’s interpretation of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter as a clue. Despite McDowell himself describing his interpretation as “heterodox”, it can remain largely orthodox, and more importantly, it significantly reexamines the relationship between the theoretical and practical themes in this chapter.
Through a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology and critical examination of McDowell’s interpretation, I present the two following claims. First, McDowell’s interpretation, which emphasizes the theoretical theme concerning the relationship between knowledge and object rather than the practical theme concerning the actions of multiple subjects, sharply captures the core concerns of Phenomenology. Second, by understanding the first part of the “Self-Consciousness” chapter (Self-Consciousness A) within the domain of these theoretical themes, the following part of this chapter (Self-Consciousness B) can be properly interpreted as addressing the practical issues that arise within these theoretical concerns. This practical theme is the problems that accompany the practice of a certain theory of “knowledge”. This paper concludes that one of the crucial insights of Phenomenology is that one cannot examine the validity of theories of knowledge without a perspective on practicing these theories.

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In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger examined in detail the primordial guilt (ursprüngliche Schuld) that haunts one as long as one exists and that one must acknowledge. Heidegger viewed ethics from an ontological perspective, arguing that the source of ethical guilty being lies in the ontological character of Dasein, which cares about itself. Where does the “guilt” in “admitting one’s own guilt” originate? It is precisely because there is a primordial guilt that one is forced to acknowledge as long as one exists, and because one acknowledges this guilt and decides to behave in various ways that evil is not nullified, but can truly be established as one’s own matter. This was demonstrated in the discussion of Being and Time. However, Heidegger’s argument on resoluteness has been understood as an argument that encourages one to behave as one pleases, and has been criticized as a decisionistic assertion that one’s own arbitrary resolve decides what is good. This paper will show that Heidegger did not subscribe to the position called “decisionism,” but rather developed an argument that criticizes it. This paper proceeds as follows. First, we will review the criticisms leveled at Heidegger for being a decisionist. The criticism is that Heidegger recommends that one’s own free decision function as a norm, so to speak, instead of the norm of “Das Man” (Section 2). However, Heidegger’s intention was not to shift from one norm to another. He was aiming to break away from following some norm in the first place in order to clarify the ontological conditions that make good and bad possible (Section 3). Then, as an ontological condition for good and bad, we will see how the Dasein is described as a “primordially guilty being (ursprüngliches Schuldigsein)” (section 4). In light of these, we will again confirm that Heidegger’s argument is not decisionism (Section 5).

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Simone Weil a souvent critiqué la notion de « droit » dans ses écrits tardifs. Bien que cette réflexion soit liée aux circonstances de la fin de sa vie, elle doit également être considérée à la lumière de ses pensées antérieures. Cet article a pour but d’analyser le motif de cette critique en profondeur, en l’interprétant comme une tentative de surmonter la logique de la « force », l’un des défis majeurs auxquels elle a été confrontée tout au long de sa vie. D’après la réflexion qu’elle avait approfondie à travers ses expériences, tel que le travail en usine et la participation à la guerre, tous les êtres humains sont soumis à la force de manière égale, qu’ils l’exercent ou la subissent. Par un mécanisme psychique qu’elle nomme « pesanteur », les forts sont automatiquement poussés à exercer leur force, tandis que les faibles tendent à docilement l’accepter comme des esclaves. Dans cette dernière position, il est parfois vain de revendiquer ses propres droits, car, le droit étant par nature dépendant de la force, ceux des impuissants ne sont plus respectés par personne, y compris par eux-mêmes. Simone Weil affirme cependant que ce sont précisément ceux plongés dans un tel « malheur » qui peuvent pousser un cri empreint du « sacré », cet élan spontané né de la souffrance qui réveille chez l’individu le désir du bien pur. Ainsi, de par l’authenticité et l’universalité du désir, ce cri transcende les distinctions de forces et rend chaque être humain respectable. C’est pour ouvrir la possibilité de s’éveiller à ce respect universel et de l’assumer comme une « obligation » qu’elle préconise de limiter l’usage du mot « droit », exprimant ainsi le souhait d’une justice entièrement affranchie de la logique de la force.

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The practice of epistemic evaluation, which evaluates the attributability of epistemic status (knowledge, justified, rational, etc.) to beliefs held by the subject, is one of the essential activities of epistemology. The standard theory of epistemic evaluation is “purism,” which holds that the attributability of epistemic status to a belief is judged solely based on truth-relevant factors. Here, truth-relevant factors refer to factors that indicate the degree of probability that a belief is true, such as evidence supporting the truth/falsehood of the content of the belief.
However, there is a counterargument to this standard position that supports the following “moral encroachment” thesis (hereafter ME): the attributability of epistemic status to a belief p held by a subject depends on moral factors that are not truth-relevant with respect to p. If purism is correct, for example, if the evidence that subjects S1 and S2 have for a proposition p is identical - there is no difference in truth-relevant factors - then when S1 and S2 believe p, the epistemic status attributed to their beliefs will always be the same. In contrast, if ME is correct, then even with identical evidence, the possibility of attributing epistemic status to p can vary depending on whether a particular moral factor is present or not. In other words, even if there is no difference in truth-relevant factors, if there is a difference in moral factors, the epistemic evaluation result will change.
In this paper, after a close examination of this ME argument, we will show that the existing ME positions proposed so far cannot be accepted as valid. However, since purism also has unresolved problems, I propose a new ME variant called “rule ME” that can avoid the problems of both positions. Through the above discussion, the relationship between the activity of epistemic evaluation and moral factors will be organized appropriately.

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Haya Akegarasu (1877–1954) was a priest of the Otani sect of Shin-Buddhism who was active from the Meiji to Showa periods. From 1903, he serialized 8 years (55 times) in the magazine Seishinkai, under the title “Reading Tanni-shō”, which laid the foundation for the popularization of Tanni-shō in the modern era. Akegarasu’s interpretation of Tanni-shō is different from the literary interpretations in the Edo period. It was a new way of reading the teachings of Tanni-shō as “reading in light of one’s experiences, deeply accepting one’s evil, and rejoicing in the salvation of Amida Buddha, who targets such evildoers.” However, previous studies have pointed out that this way of reading may lead to objections that are different from Shinran’s teachings, as it includes feelings based on personal religious experiences.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify that Akegarasu’s interpretation of Tanni-shō is not a mere confession of faith, but an expression supported by a fixed theory. Akegarasu’s “Reading Tanni-shō” was later published under the title Tanni-shō Lecture (1911). By focusing on the highly unique interpretation given in Chapter 7, I will examine the relationship between Akegarasu’s interpretation, which can be said to be subjective, and the theory of three vows transfer, which is said to be used by Amida Buddha to save human beings, and clarify the reason why Akegarasu made such an interpretation.

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This article examines whether utilitarianism justifies wildlife management by hunting (Hereafter, such hunting is referred to as “therapeutic hunting”). People kill certain animals administratively to secure the health of the ecosystem and/or to preserve the aggregate welfare of the target species. In either case, such intervention is considered essential, and utilitarianism is often used to support these arguments. This is probably because this form of hunting is considered as increasing overall welfare, i. e., achieving the goals of utilitarianism, since it is done to prevent predictable undesirable outcomes, considering the impact on the whole and the value entities that are prioritized.
However, this article points out that, contrary to such a view, attempts to justify therapeutic hunting by using utilitarianism as a support are unlikely to succeed. The conventional argument in defense of hunting is a partial and truncated use of utilitarianism and overlooks several factors that should be taken into account. For example, hunting is not a method that considers the welfare of animals, nor is it a rational method. Also, if hunting based on utilitarianism is interpreted correctly, it is clear that there are fewer situations in which it is conducted than is usually thought. In addition, the fact that alternatives to hunting exist makes it difficult to justify therapeutic hunting through utilitarianism.
Certainly, the utilitarian principle theoretically condones the killing of wild animals in some aspects, but several conditions must be met to do so. Through a detailed analysis on these factors, this research intends to describe that it is not as easy to defend therapeutic hunting by the principle of utilitarianism as is generally accepted.

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