Role theory, whether based on symbolic interactionism or structural-function-alism, has been basing its analysis mainly on relations between “self” and social roles. “The other” has been considered as a mediator between “self” and social roles. But, so long as role theory has the task of linking individuals to society, it is required to recognize not “the other” which has only a secondary importance as a mediator, but “the othr” on which is bestowed a unique theoretical importance.
Marx's theory of reification and his theory of “value-form”, which constitutes a logical basis of the former, provide a logical structure suitable to fullfil the requirement of recognizing a unique theoretical importance of “the other”. Certainly, there have been attempts to induce the theory of reification to role theory. But they are confined to a level where perverted relations between individuals and social roles are, from the point of view of philosophical anthropology, merely described and criticized by borrowing terms from the theory of reification. They may be said to have failed to make the logical strucuture of the theory of reification correspond strictly to role theory.
This paper adopts G.H. Mead's arguments on “meaning” (which constitute a basis of hisarguments on role) to induce this logical structure to role theory. Since meanings and “value” as an economic category are both deeply connected with interactional aspects of social relationships, it is possible to set an analogy between Marx's theory of “value-form” and Mead's arguments on meaning. This paper, based on this analogy, makes it clear that the relation between “the other” and meaning/role has a uniqueness against that between “self” and meaning/role, and then attempts to reconstruct role theory. In other words, as this attempt is to link Mead's theory not to Marx's macro analysis of social structure, but to his micro analysis of commodity-exchange, it can be regarded as making it possible to radically unite Marx's theory with sociology.