The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of corporate acquisitions during the inter-war period in Japan, using the case of Oita Cement Co., Ltd. The focus of our analysis is the behavior and performance of the acquired company.
In the first half of the 1920s, most of Oita Cement's directors were from among the firm's large shareholders, who at the same time held management positions in firms in other industries, for example banking, manufacturing, and commerce, and businessmen of local fame. Foremost among these was advisor Toyoji Wada, who was a leading magnate in financial circles and had significant influence over the firm's operating policy and decision-making.
In the 1920s, Oita Cement pursued an aggressive growth strategy, including merging with two other cement companies, Asahi Cement Co. and Sakura Cement Co. At the time, Oita Cement had a burden of debt service and tried to reduce profitability through the issuance of debt bonds to finance an extensive capital expenditure program. The amount of debt increased from 1, 588, 000 yen to 7, 724, 000 yen through the 1920s.
Onoda Cement acquired Oita Cement's stocks in 1930. Two directors, Shinzo Kasai and Shuzo Karim, who also held posts as Onoda directors, together with technical experts they dispatched to the firm, played an important role in formulating and implementing the recovery plan for Oita Cement through research of the firm's manufacturing capabilities, equipment, and factory management. With this acquisition as a turning point, by the end of 1934 Oita Cement paid back its borrowings from the Industrial Bank of Japan and other banks because the firm was able to borrow fixed-rate funds by issuing bonds. Onoda Cement's technological assistance made it possible for the firm to reduce manufacturing costs. Furthermore, in 1930 the firm adopted the accounting principle of listing incurred depreciation charges as expenses and also wrote off fixed assets. As a result, in first half of the 1930s Oita Cement saw a remarkable increase in net incomes both before and after depreciation.
In conclusion, the acquiring company, Onoda Cement, promoted change in Oita Cement's behavior and contributed to its ability to regain profitability.

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The purpose of this paper is to examine oil field management in the oil regions of Pennsylvania in the latter nineteenth century, especially taking the economic interests of landownership into consideration. Much research has been done on the history of the American petroleum industry, mainly on Standard Oil Company. The research has, however, not sufficiently analyzed the crude-producing sector, which had for a long time been independent of Standard Oil's control. In this paper, we focus on the management of the United States Petroleum Company, which first developed the Pithole oil field, the site famous for the “oil rush.” What sources we depend on are the original materials preserved in the Drake Well Museum.
U.S. Petroleum was not an oil-producing company but was essentially in real estate. Although the company developed the Pithole oil field and completed the United States Well as a discovery well, all these efforts were made to cause the oil rush; creating high land prices (through the oil rush) was the ultimate purpose of the Company. In fact, after the completion of U.S. Well, the company no longer continued in petroleum development but rather divided Thomas Holmden farm (the center of petroleum development) into small lots to sub-lease to oilmen at exorbitant prices. The severe terms of lease and the “rule of capture” stimulated many oilmen to overdrill, and, as the result, crude production increased rapidly. This situation was favorable to both U.S. Petroleum, as the receiver of royalties, and the downstream sector, which demanded a large supply of cheap crude oil.
The economic interests of landownership in oil fields continued to stimulate the crude-producing business and soon came to guarantee (excessive) crude supply to the downstream sector, Standard Oil. The combination of the interest in monopolistic capital and that of landownership in the development of the American petroleum industry lasted until the New Deal era.

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This paper examines one aspect of porcelain production in modern Japan. In contrast to the neighboring Tono area, which mainly increased the number of its small-scale businesses, Seto area businesses increased their factory sizes. Seto also differed from its other neighboring area, Nagoya, which was mechanized thanks to large quantities of merchant capital.
At the beginning of the Meiji era, the Seto area attained rapid growth owing to the export of porcelain to the United States and China. But businesses were deprived of a home market by the Tono area because of its higher wages. In addition, Seto porcelain gradually seemed to reach its peak for export production because of its decreasing popularity and defeat in competition with products from other areas. The Seto area subsequently specialized in the middle process, not the final process : Seto became a subcontractor for Nagoya.
In order to cope with the difficult situation, Seto businesses used a new means of production : plaster molds. The use of plaster molds adapted relatively well to mass and homogeneous production, and businesses had to expand their factory sizes. But the domestic means of production, the potter's wheel, was still maintained. In other words, the technological innovation was a reversible change.
The expansion of factory sizes influenced Seto in other ways. There was, for example, specialization of labor, the local money market, and adjustment to new technology. To conclude, Seto's businesses unexpectedly expanded their factories' sizes, and they were able to adapt to changes in the economy and prepare for future growth.

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